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Abstract
Major cloud operators offer machine learning (ML) as a
service, enabling customers who have the data but not ML
expertise or infrastructure to train predictive models on this
data. Existing ML-as-a-service platforms require users to
reveal all training data to the service operator.
We design, implement, and evaluate Chiron, a system
for privacy-preserving machine learning as a service. First,
Chiron conceals the training data from the service operator.
Second, in keeping with how many existing ML-as-a-service
platforms work, Chiron reveals neither the training algorithm
nor the model structure to the user, providing only black-box
access to the trained model.
Chiron is implemented using SGX enclaves, but SGX
alone does not achieve the dual goals of data privacy and
model confidentiality. Chiron runs the standard ML training
toolchain (including the popular Theano framework and C
compiler) in an enclave, but the untrusted model-creation
code from the service operator is further confined in a Ryoan
sandbox to prevent it from leaking the training data outside
the enclave. To support distributed training, Chiron executes
multiple concurrent enclaves that exchange model parameters
via a parameter server.
We evaluate Chiron on popular deep learning models, fo-
cusing on benchmark image classification tasks such as CI-
FAR and ImageNet, and show that its training performance
and accuracy of the resulting models are practical for com-
mon uses of ML-as-a-service.
1. Introduction
The impressive accuracy achieved by modern machine learn-
ing (ML) in business [12], medicine [6], and communica-
tion [5, 17] motivates many data holders to apply ML to their
own datasets. Existing ML frameworks, however, are not easy
to deploy by non-expert users due to a large number of con-
figuration parameters and general lack of understanding of
why and how modern ML works. Furthermore, ML expertise
is scarce and often unrelated to data holders’ primary compe-
tency (e.g., customer relationship management or biomedical
research).
This mismatch has created a growing business in machine
learning as a service, with offerings from Google [4], Ama-
zon [2], and Microsoft [13], and several startups [3, 7, 14, 15].
ML-as-a-service promises to bring high-quality ML tech-
niques to non-expert users, but privacy and confidentiality are
obstacles to its adoption. Machine learning is useful insofar
as it enables accurate quantitative predictions. When using
conventional ML services, users are revealing precisely the
data that (they hope) can give them a competitive advantage.
If the training data is sensitive—commercial transactions,
confidential documents, medical images, etc.—owners will
not want to expose it to ML service providers and thus will
not be able to take advantage of their services.
On the service provider side, many commercial ML ser-
vices, including Google’s Prediction API and Amazon ML,
do not reveal their training algorithms or resulting models
to the customers. In part, this helps support their business:
they give customers API access to the trained models and
charge per API use. They may also be concerned about the
intellectual property contained in their proprietary models
and the configuration parameters they use for particular ML
tasks. We assume that ML services are not actually interested
in stealing their customers’ data and would be willing to
forego their access to this data in exchange for the increased
adoption of their services by privacy-sensitive customers.
Our contributions. We present Chiron,1 a system that en-
ables data holders to train ML models on an outsourced ser-
vice without revealing their training data.
The service provider is free to choose the type of the
model to train, how to configure and train it, and what
transformations, if any, to apply to the inputs into the model.
These choices can adaptively depend on the user’s data and
ML task. The user obtains API access to the trained model
but no other information about it. This matches how ML-as-
a-service operates today.
To enforce data confidentiality while allowing the provider
to select, configure, and train a model any way they want,
Chiron employs a Ryoan [41] sandbox, which in turn is based
1 In Greek mythology, Chiron is a centaur entrusted with training demigods
and heroes.
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on a hardware-protected enclave such as Intel’s SGX [18]. An
enclave alone is insufficient because it only protects trusted
code executing on an untrusted platform. Code can only be
trusted if it is public and thus can be checked by users. In
Chiron, however, the ML service provider’s code is untrusted,
thus users must be assured that this code is not stealing their
data even though they cannot inspect it.
Chiron leverages the confinement provided by Ryoan to
enable the service provider’s code to access users’ data, then
define and train a model, while preventing it from exfiltrating
the data. Users can verify that the the enclave is executing a
Ryoan sandbox extended with standard ML toolchain code,
but without seeing the specifics of the model being trained.
Ryoan inherits SGX limitations, such as vulnerability to
cache-timing and memory-access channels (discussed in §6).
For performance, Chiron places a generic, model-indep-
endent ML toolchain—in particular, the standard Theano
framework and C compiler—inside the hardware-protected
enclave but outside the sandbox. The untrusted code inside
sandbox can only interact with this framework via an in-
terface controlled by the sandbox and cannot use it to leak
information. The integrity of the toolchain and sandbox is
attested to the user. Therefore, the user only needs to trust
the sandbox and ML toolchain, both of which are public and
standard. There are no checks specific to the ML model.
Modern ML models, especially deep learning models, ben-
efit from concurrent training of multiple models on different
batches of the training data. Chiron provides support for con-
current training via a parameter server and data-oblivious
channels between enclaves that enable them to exchange
model parameters during training.
To evaluate Chiron, we focus on the popular deep learning
approach that demonstrated exceptional accuracy for many
classification tasks. We measure the convergence times, scal-
ability, and performance of Chiron when training ML mod-
els on standard benchmarks such as CIFAR [44] and Ima-
geNet [38]. We also explore the effects of training multiple
models and of varying the parameter exchange rate for several
levels of parallelism.
2. Background
2.1 Machine learning
A machine learning model (ML model) is a function with a
set of parameters that maps an input to a target output. For
example, the inputs to a facial recognition model are images,
the target is the identity of the person in the image. The model
parameters are usually floating point numbers. For example, a
linear regression model is a function f(x) =W>x where W
is the parameters (aka the weight vector) and x is the input.
In artificial neural networks, the parameters are the weights
on the connections between the nodes of the network.
We focus on supervised learning. The training data in
this case is a set of input points, each labeled with its correct
target. The goal of training is to find a set of parameters that
maximizes the model’s accuracy on the training data. This is
usually done by optimizing the objective (or loss) function,
which penalizes the model when it outputs a wrong target
on a data point. A regularization term can be added to the
objective function to penalize model complexity. This helps
prevent overfitting, when the model exhibits high accuracy
on the training data but poor accuracy on the test data.
After training has finished, the model is evaluated using
test data which was not used during training. A standard
metric is test accuracy, which is the percentage of test data
points that are classified correctly.
For many ML tasks and models, the objective function
cannot be optimized in one step. Instead, the learning algo-
rithm initializes the model parameters, then iteratively feeds
batches of training data to the model, calculates the loss, and
updates the parameters to reduce the loss. Training typically
finishes when the loss value stops decreasing or when pa-
rameter updates become smaller than a certain threshold, i.e.,
when the model converges, or else after a fixed number of
iterations, or when the model achieves acceptable accuracy
on a validation dataset (distinct from the training dataset).
Most modern ML algorithms have a set of tunable hyper-
parameters, distinct from the model parameters. Hyper-
parameters control the configuration of the algorithm such as
the number of training iterations, the ratio of regularization
term in the loss function, the size of each training batch, etc.
Deep learning. Deep learning has become very popular for
many ML tasks, especially related to computer vision and
image recognition (e.g., [44, 45]). Deep learning models
are composed of layers of nonlinear mappings from input
to intermediate hidden states and finally to output. Each
connection between layers has a floating point weight matrix
as parameters. These weights are updated during training. The
topology of the connections between layers is task-dependent
and important to the ultimate accuracy of the model.
Training a deep neural network on a large dataset can take
a long time. A common way to scale deep learning is through
data and model parallelism, with multiple models training
concurrently and exchanging parameters via a parameter
server [34, 37, 56]. The training dataset is partitioned into
subsets and a separate model is trained on each subset. The
parameter server stores the global set of all model parameters.
During training, each local model pulls the parameters from
this server, calculates the updates based on its current batch
of training data, then pushes these updates back to the server,
which updates the global parameters.
Model design vs. model training. In the architecture of
Chiron, we distinguish model design from model training
(see §4.2). Model design code specifies the type and topology
of the model, the loss function, the optimization algorithm,
the values of the hyper-parameters, and the transformations,
if any, to apply to the model inputs (e.g., scaling, rotating, or
resampling images).
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def logistic_regression(dim, lr):
# initialize parameters as all zeros
W = theano.shared(value=np.zeros(dim))
# input and target node
x = T.matrix(’x’)
t = T.vector(’t’)
# sigmoid function on dot product
# between input and W
y = T.nnet.sigmoid(T.dot(x, W))
# loss function
loss = T.nnet.binary_crossentropy(y, t).mean()
# gradient of parameters w.r.t loss
grad_W = T.grad(loss, W)
# stochastic gradient descent update
sgd_step = {W: W - lr * grad_W}
# building computation graph
train_func = theano.function([x, t], loss,
updates=sgd_step)
return train_func
Figure 1. Defining logistic regression in Theano.
Model training is the generic process of repeatedly apply-
ing the model to a batch of data, calculating the loss, and
updating the parameters according to the specifications pro-
vided by the model design code.
2.2 Symbolic computation
Most ML algorithms are essentially series of mathematical
operations, e.g., matrix multiplication that maps input to
output or the loss calculation given the model’s output and the
corresponding target values. These operations can be defined
symbolically and thus training algorithms can be constructed
independently of the data.
Modern ML libraries including Theano [61], Tensor-
Flow [20], Chainer [62], and MXNET [33] support symbolic
computation. A model is defined as a computational graph
with input and output nodes. Inner nodes are mathematical
operations, such as element-wise addition and dot product,
that connect the computation in order from input to output.
Data is fed into the input node and flows through the series
of operations defined by the graph.
Figure 1 shows a simple example that defines a logistic
regression model in Theano for a binary classification task.
The goal is to classify input x as belonging to class 0 or class
1. The model is defined mathematically as y = σ(W>x)
where W are the parameters we are trying to learn and
σ(z) = 11+e−z is the sigmoid function with range [0, 1]. The
output y models the probability of x being classified as 1.
The loss function for logistic regression is cross-entropy,
which is defined as l(y, t) = −(t log(y)+(1−t) log(1−y)),
where y is the output defined above and t is the true target la-
bel (0 or 1). Overall, for training data D = {(xi, ti)}ni=1, our
objective is to minimizeL = 1n
∑n
i=1 l(yi, ti). The minimiza-
tion problem can be solved using stochastic gradient descent,
which calculates the gradient of the model parameters with
def design_model(dim1, dim2, lr):
# initialize parameters as all zeros
W1 = theano.shared(value=np.zeros(dim1, dim2))
W2 = theano.shared(value=np.zeros(dim2))
# input and target node
x = T.matrix(’x’)
t = T.vector(’t’)
# Layer1: relu function on dot product
# between input and W1
h = T.nnet.relu(T.dot(x, W1))
# Layer2: sigmoid function on dot product
# between hidden layer and W2
y = T.nnet.sigmoid(T.dot(h, W2))
# loss function
loss = T.nnet.binary_crossentropy(y, t).mean()
# gradient of parameters w.r.t loss
grad_W1, grad_W2 = T.grad(loss, [W1, W2])
# stochastic gradient descent update
sgd_step = {W1: W1 - lr * grad_W1,
W2: W2 - lr * grad_W2}
# building computation graph
train_func = theano.function([x, t], loss,
updates=sgd_step)
return train_func
Figure 2. Defining a simple neural network in Theano.
respect to loss L and updates the parameters by subtracting
the gradients multiplied by the learning rate hyper-parameter.
Figure 1 shows how this model is defined in Theano. It
first initializes parameters W , then defines the input and
target nodes of the computational graph, then defines the
loss and the parameter update functions. Finally, it calls
theano.function to build the computational graph
given the input data nodes, output loss node, and param-
eter updates. Internally, Theano will optimize the graph and
generate and compile C code for each operation in the graph.
train func is a callable object which takes data as input,
computes the loss for that data, and updates the parameters ac-
cordingly. During training, a batch of training data is fed into
train func in each iteration until the model converges.
Figure 2 shows another Theano example, defining a two-
layer neural network for a binary classification task. The
model is y = σ(W>2 relu(W
>
1 x)) where W1 and W2 are the
parameters we want to learn and relu(z) = max(z, 0) is the
activation function. The loss function and parameter updates
are the same as in the logistic regression example.
2.3 Machine learning as a service
ML-as-a-service platforms provide convenient APIs for users
to upload their data and train an ML model. The trained model
can be returned directly to the user or made available for
querying through a special API. Many major cloud providers
now offer this service, including Google’s Prediction API [4]
(soon to be replaced by Cloud Machine Learning Engine),
Amazon ML [2], and Microsoft’s Azure ML [13].
ML-as-a-service APIs are usually provided as black boxes.
In many services, the user does not know the type of the
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model selected by the provider (which could depend on the
user’s data and task) or the details of the training. Google’s
Prediction API hides all details; users have no information
about how the model is designed and trained. Amazon ML
lets users choose a few hyper-parameters such as model size,
regularization, and the number of training iterations. The
choice of the model depends on these hyper-parameters but
is invisible to the user. Model training involves stochastic
gradient descent but the implementation details are hidden.
Microsoft’s Azure ML provides a wide range of built-in
models. Users can choose a model but have no information
about the implementation details of the learning algorithm.
Our design of Chiron preserves this separation between
model design, which is proprietary to the service operator
and not available to the user, and model training, which is a
generic procedure of repeatedly applying the training function
to batches of training data.
2.4 Hardware-protected enclaves
Software Guard Extensions (SGX [18]), available on Intel
processors starting with Skylake, provide enclaves that pro-
tect code and data from all other software on the platform,
including privileged software such as the operating system
and hypervisor. Code in an enclave can safely operate on
secret data without fear of unintentional disclosure to the
platform. The privacy and integrity of the enclave is enforced
by hardware [18]. Enclaves are sometimes called trusted exe-
cution environments (TEEs), but we will use “enclave” as a
generic term.
SGX supports remote attestation of the code and data that
make up the initial state of the enclave. This enables a remote
user to verify that the initial code and data matching a given
cryptographic hash are loaded into a genuine enclave. Remote
attestation is always the first step in bootstrapping a secure
channel to an enclave.
Attacks on SGX. The design of SGX leaves untrusted privi-
leged software in control of system resources, enabling it to
mount subtle attacks (see §6) which are beyond the scope of
this paper.
Rollback. A platform can rollback persistent state. While
SGX allows enclaves to hash and encrypt data for storage
using a hardware-generated secret key, it provides no guaran-
tees about freshness. This drawback forces enclave designers
to rely on hardware counters [60], which have limitations and
performance issues, or software-based strategies that leverage
other machines [49].
Enclave indistinguishably. While SGX enables enclaves to
attest their integrity to outside parties, nothing prevents the
platform from instantiating multiple copies of enclaves. With-
out a mechanism to uniquely identify different instances of
the same enclave, a malicious platform could confuse remote
users about the state of a particular enclave by maliciously
redirecting communication between a set of enclaves that
remote users perceive as a single enclave.
2.5 Ryoan
Ryoan [41] enables service providers to keep proprietary code
secret while simultaneously ensuring users that the confined
code cannot leak their data. Instead of asking users to trust
the provider’s code, Ryoan asks them to trust the sandbox that
confines this code. Users can audit Ryoan to gain confidence
in its correctness.
Ryoan is based on Native Client [53, 66], which uses
compiler techniques to confine code. Binaries are checked
at load time to ensure they are properly restricted. Confined
code relies on the sandbox for all interactions with the outside
world. Ryoan runs inside an SGX enclave, which removes
the need to trust the privileged software of the computational
platform.
3. Threat Model
The primary goal of Chiron is to protect users’ data from ma-
licious providers of ML-as-a-service. We assume that training
a model and deploying it afterwards both take place on the
provider’s computational platform. Training data should re-
main confidential while the model is being trained, even if the
model architecture, loss and optimization functions, and the
hyper-parameters of the training algorithm are defined by the
service provider. Queries to the model and its outputs should
remain confidential when a trained model is being used.
We assume that the entire platform is untrusted, includ-
ing the privileged code such as the operating system and
hypervisor. The attacker could be the machine’s owner and
operator, a curious or even malicious administrator, or an
invader who has taken control of the OS and/or hypervisor.
The attacker may own a virtual machine (VM) physically
co-located with the VM being attacked or she could even be
a malicious OS developer and add functionality that directly
records user input. Therefore, Chiron aims to prevent the
untrusted code used during training from exfiltrating secrets
about the training data to the underlying platform.
By default, Chiron does not reveal any information about
the model architecture or training to the user. This matches
the current practice of many commercial ML-as-a-service
operators (see § 2.3).
Trusted computing base. Both the user and the service
operator must trust Ryoan’s sandboxing code, which we
assume will be distributed by a disinterested third party.
Ryoan is a generic sandbox that is not tailored to machine
learning. Our prototype makes several modifications to Ryoan
to accommodate Chiron, such as the logic for distributed
enclaves to coordinate model setup (see § 4 for a summary of
these modifications).
Ryoan requires both parties to trust the hardware and its
implementation of SGX and SGX is more complicated than
most hardware features [23]. Remote attestation for enclaves
requires trusting a remote attestation service [8]. In §6, we
discuss the limitations of Chiron with respect to the covert
and side channels affecting SGX.
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Figure 3. Chiron architecture.
We assume a standard, generic ML toolchain for defining
and training models. In our prototype, we use the popular
Theano framework for this purpose. Because the code of ML
toolchains such as Theano is public and well-understood,
we assume that it has been scrutinized and that it does not
deliberately steal information about the training data and
exfiltrate it from the enclave where it executes. The enclave
attests to the identity of Ryoan, and Ryoan attests to the
identity of the ML toolchain (further details about the chain
of trust are available in [41]).
Denial of service. Denial of service is outside the scope of
our threat model. The service provider’s model design code
can simply refuse to run or the underlying untrusted operating
system can refuse to schedule our trusted code. The provider
can skip the training or train an inaccurate model. We assume
that the user will test any generated model with data held back
from the training dataset to see if the model is sufficiently
accurate for their purposes. This is identical to the current
usage of ML-as-a-service.
Adversarial access to the model. A trained model accessed
by an adversary, even via black-box queries, may leak its
training data either accidentally [57], or because the model
was maliciously designed [59] to reveal its training data in
response to certain queries. This appears to be a generic
feature of ML models, such as deep neural networks, that
have very high memorization capacity. This threat is still
poorly understood and no generic mitigations are currently
available (see discussion in §8).
Chiron loads trained models into special query enclaves
protected with a key that the provider does not know (see
§4.5). A model can be queried only by the user whose data
was used to train it. Adversaries, including the provider itself,
can neither observe the user’s queries, nor query the model
themselves. This scenario corresponds to many common uses
of ML-as-a-service.
4. Design
The main component of Chiron is the training enclave (seen
in Figure 3), which consists of a Ryoan sandbox (which is
part of “Admin code” in the figure) extended with a standard
ML toolchain (Theano, in our implementation). The cloud
provider platform encompasses all system software including
the operating system and hypervisor. The code in the training
enclave is public, so its integrity can be remotely attested
using standard remote attestation for enclaves [18]. The
service provider loads its own untrusted code into the Ryoan
sandbox and makes one or more training enclaves available to
the user. The user connects to training enclaves and submits
data. Service provider code then performs two tasks.
First, service provider code sets up the model architecture,
loss function, optimization function, and training hyper-
parameters. These choices may depend on the user’s data,
but Chiron confinement prevents service provider code from
leaking information about that data outside the sandbox.
Some existing ML services allow users to specify certain
hyper-parameters. For example, Amazon ML lets users set
the number of training iterations. In principle, Chiron could
support this by adding trusted enforcement code to the
ML toolchain that checks the service provider’s compliance
with the user-specified hyper-parameters. In our current
prototype, we assume that the service provider controls all
hyper-parameters (this matches how Google’s Prediction API
operates today).
Service provider code must use Chiron’s ML toolchain
to define the model; all other forms of output are disallowed
by Chiron’s confinement. The ML toolchain compiles the
model description into executable, model-specific training
code inside the enclave.
Second, service provider code drives the training of the
model by feeding user data to the ML toolchain and invoking
the training code that updates the model parameters. If neces-
sary, service provider code may apply data transformations
(e.g., scaling or rotating images) before passing the data to
the training code. The ML toolchain executes this code as
usual, but the service provider cannot observe the state of the
model due to SGX and Ryoan sandbox protections.
When the training is distributed over multiple training en-
claves, each working on its own shard of the user’s training
data, Chiron coordinates them using a dedicated parame-
ter server enclave. Each training enclave periodically pulls
model parameters from the parameter server, updates them,
and sends them back to the parameter server. This helps all
training enclaves collectively converge to the same model.
Training enclaves exchange parameter updates with the pa-
rameter server via secure channels that only send fixed-sized
messages at a fixed rate. Updates thus do not leak information
about the training data or the current state of the model.
Figure 3 shows the architecture of Chiron. Service
provider code is confined in several training enclaves, where
it may interact through a controlled interface with a trusted
ML toolchain. All enclaves contain trusted admin code, which
includes the code for establishing secure channels, managing
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access to other outside resources, and loading and sandboxing
service provider code.
After training has finished, Chiron outputs a model en-
crypted with a key known only to the user. The service
provider may send the model to the user or keep it, in which
case the model is instantiated in a dedicated query enclave
and the user must use Chiron to submit encrypted queries and
receive the model’s outputs.
Ryoan modifications. First, Chiron replaces Ryoan’s com-
munication model. Ryoan is designed for request-oriented
services, allowing untrusted code to send one message for
every request. Chiron is optimized for the iterative nature of
ML training: it allows many messages for a single input, but
sends them at a fixed rate.
Second, Ryoan supports labeled data to help multiple ser-
vice providers who do not trust each other to avoid disclosing
their secrets to the user. This functionality is not useful for
Chiron, which assumes that all untrusted code is written by a
single service provider.
Finally, Ryoan mitigates the cost of constructing enclaves
by providing a mechanism to reuse initialized enclaves with-
out mixing data from different users. This is important to
applications that run on the order of seconds per request.
Chiron, however, is designed to support ML model training,
which runs on the order of hours or even days, and initial-
ization time is a tiny fraction of the total execution time.
Therefore, Chiron does not reuse enclaves because the time
and space overheads for reuse outweigh the benefits.
4.1 Initialization
To initialize Chiron, the service provider starts up the pa-
rameter server and a set of training enclaves. The parameter
server and training enclaves attest each other and construct
secure communication channels (see §4.4 for details). Having
established a secure channel with each training enclave, the
parameter server generates a nonce using randomness from
the processor and sends it to the training enclaves over the
secure channels. This nonce uniquely identifies the parameter
server instance.
After receiving the nonce, training enclaves load untrusted
service provider code and wait to be contacted by the user.
The user verifies the integrity of each training enclave via
attestation and establishes a pairwise secure channel with
each one (see §4.4 for details).
Through secure channel establishment, each training en-
clave learns the user’s public key. This public key is for-
warded to the parameter server and the parameter server’s
nonce is forwarded to the user. To ensure that all training
enclaves have been contacted by the same user, the server
checks whether it received the same public key from every
training enclave; otherwise, it does not allow training to be-
gin. The user ensures that all training enclaves are using the
same parameter server by comparing the nonces received
from the training enclaves; otherwise, he does not send the
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User Training Data 
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Figure 4. Training enclave architecture. 1) Untrusted service
provider code examines data, then generates a model spec
and passes it to the ML toolchain. 2) ML toolchain uses the
spec to generate model-training code. 3) Service provider
code transforms data and breaks it into batches for training.
4) Model-training code is invoked for each batch, updating
the model.
data. These checks are necessary since SGX does not prevent
the platform from instantiating multiple, unexpected copies
of Chiron enclaves and directing network traffic to them.
The user then shards training data into n pieces for
n training enclaves (randomly or according to any other
criterion) and sends each shard to a distinct training enclave
along with the learning task (e.g., if the task is classification,
the specification includes the output classes of the model).
Each training enclave exposes the data shard and the learning
task to service provider code so that it can define the model
and begin training.
4.2 Training enclave
Each training enclave is a Ryoan [41] sandbox augmented
with an ML toolchain, as depicted in Figure 4. The sandbox
confines service provider code and supports the following
interfaces: get data allows confined code to read user
data, build model allows it to construct a model, train -
model allows it to train the model for a single iteration. The
following interfaces are not depicted in the figure to avoid
clutter: examine model allows untrusted code to examine
the model as it is being trained, test model allows it to
test the model on validation data, and finish notifies the
trusted code that training is complete (unless the user gets to
set the number of iterations).
Each training enclave has a life cycle consisting of four
stages: initialize, model design, model training, and dead.
Transitions between the stages are determined by the confined
code’s use of the interfaces described above.
Initialize stage. Each new training enclave starts in this stage.
It initializes trusted code before loading the untrusted service
provider code. In this stage, service provider code can interact
with the network and persistent storage, which it may use
to initialize itself (e.g., load the latest model configurations).
After this process has finished, the untrusted code calls get -
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def untrusted_design_model(dim1, dim2, lr):
# same design code as in Figure 2
...
# serialize the python objects
model_str = serialize(x, t, loss, sgd_step)
# make a call to trusted build_model and
# let Chiron take over
build_model(model_str)
Figure 5. Building a model in Chiron.
data to transition to the model design stage. If data is not
yet available, the training enclave will wait until it is available
before returning control to the service provider code.
Model design stage. In the model design stage (shown in
the left half of Figure 4), the untrusted service provider
code has access to the user’s data and learning task. Service
provider code is now confined and its access to the network
and persistent storage is cut off by the admin code in the
training enclave. Confined code may call get data at any
time to read some or all of the data. The specification of the
learning task is always prepended to the data and service
provider code can access it through get data. This allows
service provider code to adaptively choose the architecture
and hyper-parameters of the model depending on the nature
of the data or the user-specified task. For example, for an
image classification task, it may adaptively choose a support
vector machine (SVM) or an artificial neural network.
Service provider code defines the model, including its
computational graph, loss function, and the hyper-parameters.
These are standard Theano operations, illustrated in Figures 1
and 2 in Section 2.2.
In Chiron, model design is separated from model training.
After defining the model, service provider code must call
build model with a description of the model, as shown in
Figure 5. This invokes generic, data- and model-independent
Theano code, which is trusted and runs outside the sandbox.
It generates the model-training function. The model is now
ready for training and the training enclave transitions to the
model training stage.
Code generation. Modern ML libraries such as Theano
optimize the training process by generating, compiling, and
executing model-specific native code. While it is technically
possible to build and train an ML model without code
generation, this dramatically decreases training performance.
Therefore, in Chiron we opted to keep code generation intact.
Our sandboxing mechanism [41] relies on examining all
code before it is loaded. Therefore, we cannot let service
provider code directly generate executable code lest it use
this code to escape the sandbox. Instead, we use a trusted
Theano toolchain to generate the code (the same way as it
does in conventional usage), based on the specification from
the sandboxed service provider code.
An alternative solution would be to include the ML
toolchain in service provider code and provide a sandbox
interface that (1) checks that the generated code does not
violate the sandbox and (2) safely loads it. This would result
in a smaller trusted computing base because Chiron would
no longer trust the code generation component of the ML
toolchain. On the negative side, this approach would incur a
non-trivial performance penalty. For example, the authors of
Native Client report execution time overheads for sandboxed
code as high as 43% on SPECC2000 benchmarks [53]. We
leave a thorough exploration of this approach to future work.
Coordination between training enclaves. Because each
training enclave receives a different shard of the data, Ch-
iron allows confined code to broadcast one message of a
pre-defined size to all other training enclaves. The purpose
of this message is for all training enclaves running confined
model design code to agree on the same model. For example,
the service provider can designate one training enclave as
a leader who defines the model based on its sample of the
user’s data (or, alternatively, based on the reports from other
training enclaves) and broadcasts its decision to all training
enclaves. The timing of this message creates creates a timing
channel (see §6 for details), thus this added flexibility comes
at the cost of leaking a few more bits.
If this additional leakage is unacceptable, users could
randomly select a data sample and send it to all training
enclaves along with the data shards. This enables the service
provider to coordinate model choice without exchanging
messages if this choice is deterministic.
Model training stage. The model training stage is shown in
the right half of Figure 4. Before returning control to service
provider code, the training enclave contacts the parameter
server, initializing copies of the newly created model parame-
ters. If they already exist, the training enclave instead updates
local parameters with the current values obtained from param-
eter server. Throughout the training stage, a separate thread
exchanges periodic updates with the parameter server. After
exchanging data with the parameter server, Chiron returns
control to service provider code. Service provider code up-
dates the local parameters by calling train model on a
batch of training data. The train model function may be
called as many times as necessary.
Each invocation of train model applies train func.
This is a callable object, generated from the model defini-
tion, which takes a batch of data as input, computes the
loss for that data, and updates the parameters accordingly.
The train func object is generated by the trusted ML
toolchain and is therefore trusted not to leak.
Service provider code signals to trusted code that training
has finished by calling finish. Service provider code may
call examine model and test model at any time during
model training to help decide that the model is ready. The
examine model interface allows service provider code to
examine properties of the model (e.g., the values of the loss
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function or parameter gradients in the most recent round of
training). The test model interface allows untrusted code
to evaluate the model on validation data. This approach gives
service providers the most flexibility. Chiron could easily
adopt other policies, e.g., letting the user specify the total
number of train model invocations.
Dead stage. After transitioning to the dead stage, service
provider code is no longer executed. Chiron encrypts the final
model with a symmetric key provided by the user. It then
returns a hash of the model to the user, before storing the
encrypted model in the platform. See §4.5 for an explanation
of how the user can access the model.
4.3 Parameter exchange
Parameter server. The parameter server is a trusted, in-
memory key-value store which runs in a dedicated enclave.
Training enclaves initialize a particular set of keys that
represent model parameters. During training, the parameter
server exchanges parameters with each training enclave. This
design is standard in distributed machine learning, e.g., it is
similar to the parameter store in Project Adam [34].
Updates from each training enclave contain the differences
between its current parameters and those it received in the
last communication with the parameter server. The parameter
server applies these differences to its own copies of the
parameters and replies with the updated values. The training
enclave replaces its parameters with the updated values from
the parameter server.
Fixed-rate exchange. Exchanges between each training
enclave and the parameter server are network operations and
therefore visible to the platform. The content of the messages
is always encrypted but Chiron does not hide the fact that
communication is taking place.
Chiron prevents service provider code from turning these
exchanges into a covert channel by ensuring that their tim-
ing is data-independent. Instead of tying the frequency of
exchanges to the frequency of updates (e.g., exchange af-
ter every call to train model), Chiron adopts a fixed-rate
update policy. The parameter-exchange thread never synchro-
nizes with the data-processing thread. Instead, it sleeps for
a configurable amount of time, performs an exchange, then
sleeps again.
Chiron relies on the platform to schedule the parameter-
exchange thread according to this policy. Relying on the
platform as a source of time is safe in this case because the
platform cannot see the training data, thus any scheduling
policy it chooses must be data-oblivious.
4.4 Secure communication channels
Communication channels between the enclaves and between
the user and the enclaves are secured using AES-GCM [40],
and an authenticated key agreement protocol, which together
provide end-to-end application-level encryption, message
integrity, and endpoint authentication. Keys are derived sepa-
rately for each connection and never persisted. Per-connection
keys keep the platform operator from transparently replacing
enclaves because a new enclave will need to establish a new
channel, alerting the victim to the disruption.
To establish communication with a new enclave instance,
Chiron uses the standard, SGX-specific Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol as defined by Intel [19]. This protocol
uses hardware-signed SGX attestations to identify enclaves
and prevent man-in-middle attacks. Each attestation uniquely
identifies the initial code and data of the enclave being
attested, thus this protocol allows only valid enclaves that
are running the correct software to exchange keys. Every
message in the key exchange is embedded in an attestation
and thus signed by hardware. Enclaves use true hardware-
generated randomness from the processor to initialize the
secret parameters (i.e., private Diffie-Hellman exponents) of
the exchange. The user is identified by a public key rather
than hardware attestation; other than this, enclave-to-enclave
and user-to-enclave key exchange protocols are identical.
In principle, Chiron could include an implementation
of transport layer security (TLS). Adopting TLS for inter-
enclave communication, however, is an overkill because SGX
attestations replace TLS authentication and these attestations
are already required by Chiron to verify enclave integrity.
Inter-enclave communication does not need to be backward-
compatible with other code. When contacting the user, Chiron
uses TLS because Chiron does not directly control the code
on the user’s machine. Furthermore, TLS certificates may be
useful to verify the origin of untrusted service provider code.
4.5 Using a trained model
Chiron enforces model ownership: only the owner of the data
used to train the model may query this model. The model
is encrypted with a key provided by the user, and Chiron
provides a “query enclave” that the service provider can run
to safely decrypt the model and respond to user queries to
the model. Each query enclave contains enough of the ML
toolchain to load the trained model, apply it to user’s query,
and return the output to the user.
Chiron stores trained models in platform controlled per-
sistent storage, which is vulnerable to rollback attacks (see
§2.4). To ensure that the user always uses the freshest model,
the user attaches the expected hash of the model to any query,
and Chiron ensures that the hash matches the loaded model
before responding to the query.
We assume that after the model has been created, the user
measures its test accuracy on a subset of the data withheld
from the training dataset (see §2) and proceeds to use the
model only if test accuracy is acceptable.
As mentioned in §4, using the model may require applying
some transformations to the inputs. These transformations
may be proprietary to the service provider and thus cannot
be disclosed to the user. To support this functionality, Chiron
includes a Ryoan sandbox that confines untrusted data trans-
formation code written by the service provider and loaded
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into the query enclave. Untrusted provider code within the
query enclave can examine and query the model. The result of
the query is returned to the untrusted code, which then passes
it to the user over the secure channel. Since the untrusted code
is confined, it cannot leak this result to the service provider.
Chiron pads or truncates the message to a fixed size to ensure
that message sizes are data-oblivious.
5. Implementation Issues
SGX compatibility. All Chiron components are designed to
run in SGX enclaves. We use an SGX compatibility layer
implemented in libc. Our modified libc marshals system call
arguments and passes them to the training enclave; it also
unmarshals results. Finally, it protects against all currently
known Iago attacks [30].
C compiler. Chiron must replace Theano’s C compiler,
which is gcc. To avoid a side channel from the compilation
process, the compiler running in the training enclave cannot
write files, because that would leak model-building activities
to the untrusted platform. We could not get gcc to stop writing
files, thus Chiron uses libclang and llvm’s execution engine
to compile the model training code (following the “clang-
interpreter” example from the llvm repository [11]). We
measure the performance cost of this decision in Section 7.3.
Parameter server. The Chiron parameter server is based
on Redis version 3.2.8 [16], modified to support Chiron’s
application-level encryption and to apply received updates to
the in-memory parameters. Training enclaves initialize a key
for each model parameter. In each parameter exchange, the
parameter server adds any value received from the training
enclaves to the value of the associated key and returns the
updated value.
The parameter server uses time from the platform to
calculate the epoch (e.g., nanosleep). The platform can
deny service by providing inconsistent time but cannot leak
the data via a timing channel (see §4.3).
Managing data within enclave. Chiron requires that users
shard their data before uploading it to the set of training
enclaves. Our Chiron prototype assumes that each shard will
fit in enclave memory because this simplifies the design. In
our experiments, the shards are always small enough to fit.
That said, enclave memory is a limited resource, with current
SGX hardware restricted to 128MB of enclave memory.
Furthermore, physical memory for enclaves must be statically
partitioned at boot time, and the memory dedicated to enclave
use is not usable by non-enclave code. This static partitioning
will likely lead to conservative partition sizes.
When data does not fit into memory, Chiron streams data
in. Trusted code in each training enclave reads a chunk of
data of configurable size at a configurable fixed rate (similar
to our fixed-rate parameter exchange), overwriting the old
chunk. It is the service provider’s job to ensure that the fixed
rates are adequate given the time it takes to train on each
chunk. We leave exploration of efficient policies for managing
insufficient enclave memory for future work.
6. Limitations
Covert and side channels. Chiron is based on Ryoan, which
blocks untrusted code from exfiltrating information about the
training data to the platform using software interfaces such
as syscall sequences and arguments. Chiron inherits Ryoan’s
limitations regarding covert and side channels, which in turn
result from the limitations of the underlying hardware—in
particular, the internal monitoring that an untrusted platform
can perform using the processor monitoring unit (PMU). Intel
explicitly places certain timing channels outside the scope
of SGX [42]. Untrusted code can leak bits by modulating
cache accesses, page accesses, execution time, etc. These
limitations are discussed at length by Hunt et al. [41].
The current specification for SGX allows privileged soft-
ware to manipulate the page tables of an enclave to observe
its code and data trace at page-level granularity. This can
lead to devastating attacks that use application-specific infor-
mation to reconstruct fine-grained secrets from these coarse
addresses, e.g., words in a document and images [65]. While
these channels pose a serious risk for SGX as it exists to-
day, we hope that hardware vendors will mitigate them in the
future. Even assuming the current SGX architecture, there
is active ongoing research on how to use other processor
features, e.g., transactional memory support, to detect and
prevent privileged software from attacking enclaves [32, 55].
In a machine learning context, one software technique for
mitigating page-based side channel attacks is to transform the
learning algorithm so that it is data-oblivious, i.e., its access
pattern is independent of the training data [50]. Chiron, how-
ever, is designed to support ML-as-a-service where service
providers do not reveal their models to users. In this setting,
the provider’s code that sets up the model is both untrusted
and hidden from the user. There is no way for the user to
verify that it is indeed data-oblivious.
Chiron also has Chiron-specific timing channels. For ex-
ample, an adversarial service provider can encode some secret
about the training data in the number of training iterations
(if that hyper-parameter is under the provider’s control), time
until the model coordination message is broadcast or the
training time. Similarly, refusing to terminate or outputting a
deliberately inaccurate model is another channel. Our current
prototype does not mitigate these channels which can leak
dozens of bits given the current design of Chiron. Standard
defenses include quantizing or padding execution time.
Lack of GPU support. State-of-the-art deep learning mod-
els rely on GPUs to achieve high performance during train-
ing [45]. Chiron cannot use GPUs because Chiron fundamen-
tally relies on hardware-supported trusted execution environ-
ments, such as those enabled by SGX. These environments
do not exist on today’s GPUs. If users’ data is processed on a
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GPU, we are not aware of any techniques that can protect it
from the GPU operator.
Some frameworks for distributed deep learning [34, 37] do
not use GPUs because GPUs’ memory limitations inherently
restrict the size of the models that can be trained. More recent
work showed how to take advantage of model parallelism [54]
and specialized parameter servers [36] to support distributed
learning with GPUs.
7. Evaluation
Our evaluation of Chiron is conducted on two machines
(A and B). Machine A has a 8-core Intel Xeon 3.20GHz
processor with 16 GB RAM and machine B has a 4-core Intel
Core i7-6700 3.40GHz processor with 32 GB RAM. We use
Theano version 0.8.2. The Ryoan sandbox used is based on
NaCl commit 2d5bba1. All enclaves use Ryoan’s modified
eglibc version 2.19.
CIFAR is an object classification dataset with 50,000
training images (ten categories, 5,000 images per category)
and 10,000 test images [44]. Each image is 32x32 pixels, each
pixel has three 8-bit values corresponding to RGB intensities.
To benchmark the CIFAR dataset, we use a 9-layer VGG-
style network [58] with batch normalization [43]. The trained
model has 2.3 million parameters. We use L2 regularization
with the ratio of 0.0005 and stochastic gradient descent with
the learning rate of 0.1, batch size of 128 and 60 training
epochs (each epoch sweeps through the whole dataset).
ImageNet is a large-scale visual object recognition
dataset [38]. The original dataset has over 1.2 millions images
in 1,000 categories. We picked a subset with 250,000 im-
ages in 200 categories (ImageNetLite), which is a reasonably
large dataset for current ML-as-a-service applications. We
held out 25,000 images for test evaluation. It takes about 38
hours to train a model on this dataset, which is large enough
to represent real workloads while making experimentation
tractable.
We use AlexNet for ImageNetLite training, with the same
preprocessing and configuration as [45]. We scale each image
to 128x128 pixels with three color channels (RGB) and
train the network on a randomly cropped 112x112 image.
During evaluation, we deterministically crop the image to
112x112, following the same procedure as the AlexNet
authors. The model has 6 million parameters. We also use
L2 regularization with the ratio of 0.0005, stochastic gradient
descent with the learning rate of 0.05, batch size of 64, and
60 training epochs.
7.1 Performance modeling
The Chiron prototype requires features only supported by
SGX V2. At the time of writing there is no publicly available
processor which supports SGX V2. SGX V2 introduces
additional instructions which can change memory mappings
of running enclaves. In accordance with Ryoan [41] (and
other related work [24, 52]), we evaluate performance using
an SGX performance model that mixes measurements from
an SGX V1 processor with reasonable guesses for latencies
of V2 instructions.
Our SGX performance model includes penalties for en-
clave exit events, the major source of overhead introduced by
SGX. Events that cause enclave exits are page faults, system
calls, and interrupts, which all flush the TLB. Exiting and
reentering the enclave also comes with additional overhead
from executing SGX instructions. System calls require an
explicit enclave exit then reenter (EEXIT, EENTER); page
faults and interrupts trigger an involuntary (asynchronous
in the literature [18]) exit and require a resume operation
(ERESUME).
We measure SGX instruction overheads on real SGX
hardware (a Dell Inspiron 7359 laptop with Intel Core i5-
6200U 2.3 GHz processor). Measurements were collected
using Intels SGX Linux Driver [10] and SDK [9]. Explicit
exits incur a 3.9 microsecond penalty, involuntary exits incur
a 3.14 microsecond penalty. We use a modified Linux kernel
that counts each exit event and flushes the TLB for designated
enclave threads. We multiply the exit counts by the overheads
measured on hardware and add the result to the enclave
execution time.
As explained in §5, Chiron marshals and copies system
call arguments and return values across the enclave boundary,
which also adds execution time overhead.
7.2 Parameter server throughput
Machine learning is computationally intensive and benefits
from being split across multiple enclaves, which exchange pa-
rameter updates via a parameter server. The parameter server
receives updates (usually 4-byte floating point numbers) and
performs a single floating point addition for each received
delta (applying it to the corresponding parameter). The Ch-
iron prototype parameter server is based on Redis version
3.2.8 [16]. All operations are done in memory; all persis-
tence mechanisms provided by Redis are disabled. When
using dummy clients that flood the parameter server with
updates, it saturates at 22.6 million floats per second (about
86MB/s), confirming that the network hardware and stack is
not a bottleneck for our experiments. While this performance
is sufficient for our experiments, parameter server implemen-
tation could be improved. Redis is single-threaded, which is
limiting when it must also perform floating point operations.
7.3 CIFAR experiments
We compare Chiron to the conventional baseline training time
and accuracy while varying the number of training enclaves
from two to four to eight (n). Table 1 shows the training
time, including latencies from the SGX performance model
(§7.1), for different parameter exchange policies (Ex Rate).
The table also shows the test accuracy of the resulting models,
as measured by the percentage of successfully classified test
data.
The table shows a drop in test accuracy for the resulting
model as the number of enclaves increases. This is a common
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n Ex Rate Test Acc(%) Time (hr)
Baseline 89.56 9.70
Ideal 89.38 10.07
2 1/3 avg 89.17 9.92
1/2 avg 88.50 9.79
Avg 88.98 9.69
Baseline 88.89 6.09
Ideal 88.97 6.86
4 1/3 avg 88.38 6.59
1/2 avg 87.66 6.70
Avg 88.07 6.74
Baseline 88.52 3.14
Ideal 88.28 3.79
8(1) 1/3 avg 86.66 3.91
1/2 avg 86.24 3.81
Avg 81.09 3.73
Baseline 88.41 3.18
Ideal 88.05 3.68
8(2) 1/3 avg 86.90 3.57
1/2 avg 86.46 3.67
Avg 84.63 3.66
Table 1. Performance and accuracy with different param-
eter exchange policies and number of training enclaves (n).
Baseline is unmodified Theano, exchanging parameters after
each training epoch. Ideal is Chiron without fixed-rating the
exchange. Avg is Chiron with the fixed rate set to the average
duration of one training iteration. Half and one-third Avg
exchange at twice and three times the rate of Avg. For 8 en-
claves, the 8(1) configuration runs all 8 enclaves on machine
A (8 cores), 8(2) runs five enclaves and the parameter server
on machine A and the remaining three enclaves on machine
B (4 cores).
observation in the asynchronous distributed learning setting,
known as the gradient staleness problem [31]. The problem
arises because by the time a worker has finished one round of
calculating updates and has sent the results to the parameter
server, the parameters may have been updated a number
of times. Very stale updates disrupt the convergence of
the model. Fixing this issue is an active research problem
in the machine learning community. By fixed-rating the
communication between the parameter server and training
enclaves, test accuracy can decrease by up to 6%. Higher
rates of fixed-rate communication result in more accurate
models.
In the ideal case, local parameters are downloaded from
the parameter server right before a training iteration starts,
and the updates are sent right after the iteration finishes. When
communication is fixed rate, there is some time between
downloading the parameters and starting an iteration (simi-
larly there is time between sending updates and finishing the
iteration). During this lag, the parameters could be updated
which would result in updates that are more stale than the
ideal case.
Top1(%) Top5(%) Train(hr) Query(sec)
Baseline 55.12 78.51 39.83 3825.30
Chiron 52.41 76.42 38.85 3843.53
Table 2. Model accuracy, training time, and query time for
ImageNetLite. Top 1 is the accuracy for the most likely
prediction. Top 5 is the accuracy of the five most likely
predictions. Query shows time for querying 100,000 images
in batches of 1,000.
The performance of Chiron using the ideal parameter
exchange policy lags the baseline by 4–20%. Most of this
overhead is during the computationally intensive training
phase that executes within the enclave but outside the Ryoan
sandbox. Overheads come from enclave exits that cause
TLB flushes, slowing the memory-intensive training process.
90% or more of the enclave exits are from page faults, not
asynchronous sources, so they are difficult to eliminate. The
performance of training does not change much with different
parameter exchange policies.
7.4 ImageNetLite experiments
We demonstrate Chiron’s ability to scale to more substantial
ML tasks by training ImageNetLite using 16 training enclaves.
We use the one-third Avg parameter exchange policy in this
experiment, which does not leak training time and as shown
by the CIFAR experiments, provides best model accuracy.
Table 2 shows that Chiron slows down ImageNetLite training
by 16%, while preserving the accuracy of the trained model.
For comparison, a random guess with five chances would
have a top-5 accuracy of 0.025.
Chiron must be invoked in order to perform queries on
the model. Table 2 shows the performance impact Chiron
imposes on model queries, which is less than 1%.
Cost of outsourced training. While Chiron supports training
on machines owned by the service provider, this is not a
requirement. At the time of this writing, Amazon EC2 charges
$0.0665 per core per hour for computation and $0.02 per
GB for network communication (between data centers) [1].
Training ImageNetLite on the baseline would cost $36.19
for compute and $7.67 for network IO. Chiron increases the
compute cost to $43.12. Chiron’s network cost depends on the
parameter exchange policy, ranging from $7.67 if parameters
are exchanged using the average-iteration-length policy to
$23.00 for the 1/3-average policy. Note, however, network
bandwidth within a single data center is free, and model
training would likely occur within a single data center. Our
experiments with CIFAR show that more frequent updates
consume network bandwidth but provide better models.
8. Related Work
Secure ML environments. Ohrimenko et al. describe an
SGX-based system for multi-party machine learning on
an untrusted platform [50]. They focus on collaborative
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learning, as opposed to Chiron, which focuses on outsourced
learning and, in particular, machine learning provided as a
service by a cloud operator.
The critical distinction between the two scenarios is that
in collaborative learning, the model architecture and learning
algorithms are public, whereas in ML-as-a-service, they are
secret and proprietary to the service provider. A significant
advantage of [50] is that their learning algorithms are data-
oblivious and thus secure against page-fault side channels.
Obliviousness, however, must be verified by the clients,
thus the entire codebase inside the SGX enclave must be
public, including any data-dependent model design choices.
Therefore, [50] is unsuitable for ML-as-a-service, where the
model is chosen adaptively based on the client’s data and
task, but (in most existing ML services) remains hidden from
the client. By contrast, Chiron (1) lets training SGX enclaves
execute untrusted service provider code to adaptively define
the model, but (2) sandboxes this code to prevent it from
leaking the data outside the enclave.
CQSTR [67] lets a trusted platform operator confine
untrusted machine learning code so that it can be securely
applied to user data. By contrast, Chiron protects user data
from an untrusted platform operator.
Cryptographically protected ML. Many papers describe
how to use cryptographic techniques, including secure multi-
party computation, to learn and apply relatively simple clas-
sifiers without decrypting the data [25, 27, 28, 47, 63]. It
is not clear whether and how these techniques can be ap-
plied to modern ML problems, such as training deep neural
networks on ImageNet-scale datasets, without a prohibitive
performance penalty.
More recent work [39, 48] demonstrated how to efficiently
apply neural networks to encrypted data. As far as we know,
today there are no practical techniques for training deep
neural networks on encrypted data.
Leakage of training data from ML models. Overfitted ma-
chine learning models can be vulnerable to “membership
inference”: an adversary can infer, with black-box access
to the model, whether a given input was used to train the
model [57]. A malicious training algorithm can construct a
model that leaks significant parts of the training dataset in
response to certain queries [59].
Information leakage from the model’s training dataset
can be mitigated by differentially private learning algo-
rithms [21, 51]. These algorithms produce the same model
with approximately the same probability if a particular input
was included in the training dataset or not.
In this paper, we assume that the owner of the training
dataset and the user of the resulting model are the same, and
that the model is not exposed to other parties (including
the operator of the service that trained the model). This
assumption holds for many common uses of ML-as-a-service.
In this scenario, there are no adversaries who have query
access to the trained model.
SGX-protected execution enviroments. Several recently
proposed systems aim to protect applications from an un-
trusted platform. Haven [24], SCONE [22], and Graphene-
SGX [29] provide an environment to support unmodified
legacy applications. VC3 [52] and Opaque [68] provide SGX-
protected data processing platforms. All of these systems
assume that all of the code inside the enclave is trusted.
Chiron protects user data from untrusted code.
Side-channel attacks on SGX. As discussed in §6, side
channels can subvert the protections provided by SGX. Side
channels based on page faults [64, 65] enable the platform to
extract private data by observing page-granularity memory
accesses. Physical monitoring of the bus gives an attacker
access to word-granularity memory accesses. Existing side
channels on modern processors (e.g., cache [26], power, and
time) apply to enclave-protected code as well [42].
Processor monitoring units (PMUs) record information
about execution and can leak information about enclave code
if they are not cleared. Lee et al. demonstrate an attack using
the branch history [46]. The processor’s uncore counters (e.g.,
L3 events) are enabled during enclave execution [35] and
could possibly be used to construct a side channel.
9. Conclusion
We presented Chiron, a new system for privacy-preserving
outsourced machine learning (ML). Chiron enables data
holders to use ML-as-a-service without disclosing their data
to the service providers, yet—in keeping with the current
practice of these services—does not require that the providers
make their models, configuration parameters, and training
algorithms public.
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